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Abstract
Recent trade negotiations in the EU have provoked unprecedented levels of controversy, in particular the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the EU and the US. One crucial channel for public contestation is the
European Parliament (EP) which, following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, has to give consent to international
agreements. Thus, this article sets out to answer the question: During the dispute over TTIP, did members of the EP (MEPs)
engage in the public debate, and if so, how? If they engage in debates, what characterises their engagement: Do they en-
gage with voter concerns, do they engage in a responsive manner, and do they contribute to politicisation as quite a few
feared? Building on an analysis of newspaper coverage and plenary debates in the EP, the article shows that many sup-
porters of TTIP attempted to de-politicise the debate, while opponents most frequently evoked ‘the voice of the people’
to politicise TTIP. Thus, MEPs do not only respond to politicisation, they also attempt to make politicisation happen by
evoking public concerns. The article highlights the multifaceted relationship between responsiveness and politicisation,
where claims responding to voter concerns, are used both to incite contestation and alleviate it.
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1. Introduction
Recent trade negotiations in the EU have provoked
unprecedented levels of controversy. Particularly the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) be-
tween the EU and the US became divisive. Had the ne-
gotiations not faltered, the agreement would have been
one of the largest free trade agreement in history, and
according to its advocates, have led to job creation and
a general increase in living standards on both sides of
the Atlantic. With TTIP, however, EU trade policy “went
from being contested amongst a relatively small group
of actors largely out of public view to being actively chal-
lenged in the public sphere” (Young, 2019).
One channel for public contestation is the European
Parliament (EP) which, following the entry into force of
the Lisbon Treaty, has to consent to international agree-
ments. Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are
now in a position to defeat EU trade deals, even against
the wishes of member states and before national parlia-
ments get to weigh in. EU trade policy has always been
a carefully constructed compromise between member
state positions that often collide. With the EP’s new pow-
ers, the risk is that the difficulty of forging a common
position in the EU increases, because the Commission
has to cater to evenmore principals (da Conceição-Heldt
& Meunier, 2014). It is perhaps not surprising that a
main argument against extending the powers of the EP
in trade was that it would politicise debates on trade
agreements and legislation, making it even more dis-
ruptive (Niemann, 2011; Woolcock, 2008). Against this
background—the broad contestation of TTIP, the EP’s
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new powers, and the fears of its unruliness—, the ques-
tion raised in this article is: During the dispute over TTIP,
did MEPs engage in the public debate, and if so, how?
Following large parts of the literature, one would
not expect MEPs to engage extensively. A prevalent
view is that their link with voters is weak due to the
way “EP elections (do not) work” (Hix, Raunio, & Scully,
2003, p. 194). Instead of responding to voter prefer-
ences, MEPs’ main principals are the national parties,
who select the candidates in EP elections, and the supra-
national party groups, who control the internal affairs
of the EP (Hix, 2002, p. 688). TTIP became a difficult is-
sue for the EP, and particularly so for some of its political
groups. The plenary was supposed to decide on recom-
mendations to the Commission in June 2015, but ended
up postponing the vote, officially because there were
too many amendments tabled. Furthermore, as a new-
comer to the field of trade, it is conceivable that the EP
would like to appear as a responsible actor and refrain
from conflict with the Council or Commission (cf. Ripoll
Servent, 2013). As elected representatives, MEPs should
pay heed to the concerns of their voters, but at the same
time the majority of members in the EP wanted to see
the talks succeed and has encouraged member states to
make a better effort at selling it to their respective citi-
zens (EP, 2015a).
At the same time, in the case of the Anti-Counterfeit
Trade Agreement, where the EP vetoed a trade agree-
ment for the first time, MEPs allegedly reacted to civil
society pressure and public protests (Dür & Mateo,
2014), challenging the view of non-responsive MEPs.
International trade is an issue where MEPs can claim
ownership and are in a favourable position both to moni-
tor and impact negotiations. Consequently, trade should
be a good occasion forMEPs to demonstrate their impor-
tance. By analysing debates taking place in national me-
dia as well as in the EP plenary, the aim of this article is to
get a better understanding of the role of the EP in salient
policies. To what extent do they engage in debates, and
when they do, what characterises their engagement: Do
they engage with voter concerns; do they engage in a
responsive manner; and do they contribute to politici-
sation as feared? While we know quite a lot about the
EP’s interinstitutional activities in the case of both trade
and TTIP (e.g., Coremans & Meissner, 2018; Meissner,
2016), we know less about howMEPs engagewith public
debate. Thus, by focusing on how they approach voters
and their concerns, this article can also shed light on the
relationship between MEPs and EU citizens. In addition,
through studying the engagement ofMEPs in the TTIP de-
bate, the aim is also to explore the relationship between
responsiveness and politicisation.
In what follows, the analytical framework and ensu-
ing expectations are elaborated, before the subsequent
section presents the data and method used in the arti-
cle. The first part of the analysis briefly assesses the lev-
els of salience in three selected countries, while the sec-
ond part looks at what characterises the engagement of
MEPs. The conclusion suggests some empirical and theo-
retical implications of the findings.
2. Linking Controversy and MEPs’ Engagement
Central components of the electoral relationship are the
acts of authorisation andopportunity to hold elected rep-
resentatives to account (Pitkin, 1967). Before elections,
aspiring candidates are eager to establish that they have
done a good job in office and to convince their elec-
torate that theywill do a better job than their opponents.
Aspiring parliamentariansmake great efforts to reach po-
tential voters with their message. In-between elections
more attention is directed towards internal processes of
policy-making. Deals aremade and interests brokered be-
hind closed doors, or at least removed from the glare and
stare of the public.
Some policy issues, however, attract substantial at-
tention and stimulate a wider public debate. Such in-
stances of issue salience or contestation require that
politicians somehow address voters’ concerns (e.g.,
Wlezien & Soroka, 2012). If an issue becomes important
in public debate—if it engages mass politics (Hooghe
& Marks, 2009)—the cost of ignoring the ‘voice of the
people’ increases. Thus, issue salience has “developed
into one of the leading theories of political communica-
tion and political party behaviour” (Budge, 2015, p. 761).
Research shows that EU policies are affected by public
opinion (e.g., Bølstad, 2015; Rauh, 2019; Toshkov, 2011).
De Bruycker (2017) also demonstrates how issues that
are salient generate more responses referring to public
interest compared to non-salient ones. Others describe
how parliamentarians tend to get more engaged in is-
sues that are important to the public (Baumann, Debus,
& Gross, 2019), including matters of the EU (e.g., Auel,
Rozenberg, & Tacea, 2015; Gheyle, 2019b).
Issue salience has been described a critical de-
nominator of politicisation (Green-Pedersen, 2012;
Hoeglinger, 2016), which denotes “an increase in the
polarization of opinions, interests or values and the ex-
tent to which they are publicly advanced towards the
process of policy formation within the EU” (de Wilde,
2011, p. 560). In the words of Hutter and Grande (2014,
p. 1004): “Only topics that are frequently raised by po-
litical actors in public debates can be considered politi-
cized.” However, politicisation denotes something more
than salience in that it entails the “expansion of the
scope of conflict within the political system” (Hutter &
Grande, 2014, p. 1003). An issue can be salient—achieve
a lot of attention in the news media for example—but if
it does not engage a broader set of actors or provokes
contestation, it suggests that the conflict does not run
very deep (see Gheyle, 2019a).
On the one hand, politicians in general are keen to
“‘rid[e] the wave’ of prominent issues because they want
to appear responsive to public concerns” (Hoeglinger,
2016, p. 49). On the other hand, they might want to
add ‘fuel to the flame’ in order to attract attention to
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their own policies, gain support for their own position, or
play havoc with their opponents. When an issue—such
as TTIP—becomes increasingly salient, MEPs can get en-
gaged in various ways, whether in response to or as an
attempt to instigate contestation. Furthermore, respon-
siveness can also involve attempts to politicise an issue,
hence responsiveness and mobilisation are not mutually
exclusive. However, the implications for EU trade policy,
as well as for our understanding of the role of MEPs in
public debate and salient politics will differ.
In addition, one could argue that by getting en-
gaged or acting responsively, MEPs contribute to politi-
cisation, even if not in a pro-active manner. Gheyle
(2019a), for example, claims in this thematic issue that
parliamentarisation—the communicative behaviour of
parliamentarians—should be seen as a component of
politicisation. This obviously makes the establishment of
causal links difficult. The aim of this article, therefore,
is to explore the relationships between issue salience
and the role of MEPs, as well as between responsiveness
and politicisation.
First, the goal is to see if MEPs engaged with the TTIP
debate. As described above, large parts of the literature
lead us to expect that the relationship between MEPs
and EU citizens is fraught. The subsequent question is
whether this putative engagement is responsive in the
sense that it aims to accommodate the concerns of citi-
zens. Again, due to the lack of an electoral linkage, and
MEPs having to accommodate two principals, there is
a certain expectation that MEPs will not be responsive.
Finally, the aim is to analyse if and howMEPs responded
in a manner that could be seen as contributing to the
politicisation of the agreement. The empowerment of
the EP in trade caused fears that the trade policy would
becomemore unruly because the EP would politicise the
field1. Moreover, an issuemight be salient without being
politicised, which is why this article aims to investigate
whether and how MEPs sought to expand the political
conflict in the case of TTIP.
2.1. Engagement
There is an increasing interest in to what extent and how
national parliaments contribute to the politicisation of
European governance (see for instance Bellamy& Kröger,
2016). The specific participation of MEPs in national me-
dia debates has thus far received less attention. A general
impression is that during election campaigns, EU actors
take the backseat, while national parties run the show
(de Vreese, Banducci, Semetko, & Boomgaarden, 2006).
EU-related issues reach the media if national parties de-
cide to make it a priority (Jalali & Silva, 2011, quoted in
Adam & Maier, 2011, p. 433). The few studies that have
looked specifically at the EP’s performance in the news,
find that it does receive regular coverage (Gattermann,
2013), but that journalists tend to take a domestic per-
spective, even when they report on the EP (Gattermann
& Vasilopoulou, 2015, p. 134).
TTIP, however, was an issue where the MEPs could
potentially claimownership to a greater extent. Although
the agreement most likely would have to be ratified by
national parliaments as well, MEPs were in a favourable
position to monitor—and have an impact on—the talks
between the EU and the US. At the outset of the talks,
national parliamentarians had great difficulties accessing
the necessary documents to monitor the TTIP negotia-
tions. The EP, by contrast, was highly successful in push-
ing for access to confidential documents for all MEPs
(Rosén, 2018). Thus, in contrast to EP elections, or policy
debates where the EP plays a more marginal role, one
could argue that TTIP was a good occasion for MEPs to
demonstrate their importance without too much com-
petition. MEPs are not only dependent on the good will
of their voters for re-election, but crucially also on their
national parties, who control the nomination processes
(Hix, 2002). Having to cater to several principals, means
that MEPs do not only face the pressure from the pub-
lic when a policy is salient, but also from their national
colleagues. Studies of voting instructions to MEPs by na-
tional parties, for example, have shown that these are
not very common (Mühlböck, 2012), and mainly given
when an issue is held to be of “fundamental impor-
tance” (Raunio, 2000, p. 217). This leads to two differ-
ent expectations:
MEPs have a high level of engagement on TTIP;
MEPs from countries where TTIP is salient have a
lower level of engagement.
2.2. Responsiveness
The subsequent question is howMEPs engaged, if at all, in
debates about TTIP. It has been argued that the relation-
ship betweenMEPs and voters tends to be ignored due to
“widely held assumptions that any electoral connection
to the EP is weak because of theway EP elections (do not)
work” (Hix et al., 2003, p. 194). Hix, Noury, and Roland
(2007, p. 28) have argued that because MEPs lack the ex-
ternal motivation of re-election, “political behaviour in
the European Parliament is primarily driven by consider-
ations internal to the institution and the EU policy pro-
cess.” Thus, the contestation over EU trade policy could
be argued to leave MEPs with a dilemma, as they have to
adjudicate between their commitments to their national
party, their EP party group, as well as their voters.
But even if the electoral connection might be weak,
this is not the same as saying that it is non-existent, or
that the EP and its MEPs are content with the apparent
lack of an electoral link. Elections are not the only reason
why representatives are responsive to their constituents.
A sense of duty may compel politicians to take the in-
1 In this thematic issue, Zimmermann (2019) puts forward the concept of “layered politicisation” to depict policies that are not fully politicised. He
describes the case of EU fisheries policy, where there is polarisation and mobilisation, but low issue salience.
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terests of their constituency into account. In addition, it
is likely that both are influenced by the same objective
events (cf. Bartels, 1991, p. 458). Thus, it is reasonable
to assume that MEPs will attempt to respond to the con-
cerns of EU citizens even if they don’t have to fear their
judgement come election time.
We know less about how MEPs relate to EU citi-
zens in-between elections, as the bulk of research on
EU parliamentary democracy has concentrated on EU
elections. Key to studies that analyse the interaction
between representatives and citizens is responsiveness,
which is held to be themechanism thatmaintains the rep-
resentative relationship in-between elections (Esaiasson
& Narud, 2013). A main indicator of responsive be-
haviour is policy adaption. This is the ultimate sign
that representatives are acting on behalf of their elec-
torate. According toManin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999,
p. 9), to be responsive equals adopting policies that cit-
izens prefer. Adaption can also be presented commu-
nicatively through promises—Hobolt and Klemmensen
(2008, p. 310) use the term “rhetorical responsiveness”
for example. This concept captures the extent to which
the political issue agenda “reflects the issue most salient
to the public” (Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008, p. 320).
Yet, representatives are not always ready, or able, to
adapt to citizens’ preferences. There are also ways of re-
sponding where representatives do not necessarily take
on-board positions of citizens. However, it is crucial that
representatives “must not be found persistently at odds
with the wishes of the represented without good rea-
son in terms of their interest, without a good explana-
tion of why their wishes are not in accord with their in-
terest” (Pitkin, 1967, pp. 209-210). If representatives are
not prepared to adapt to citizens’ preferences, they will
have to give reasons for why a decision is beneficial even
if it might also cause problems. Without attempting to
justify their positions in cases where representatives act
against citizens’ preferences, it is unlikely that their posi-
tions will be seen as legitimate, as justification is central
to the democratic legitimacy of decisions (Lord, 2013).
One option for politicians is that they explain their
views, i.e., account for the reasons they do not act in ac-
cordance with citizens’ preferences (Esaiasson, Gilljam,
& Persson, 2013). Grose, Malhotra, and van Houweling
(2015, p. 725), for example, argue that representatives
tend to use “tailored explanations in order to compen-
sate for policy choices that are incongruent with con-
stituent preferences, and to reinforce policy choices con-
gruent with constituent preferences.” To alleviate ac-
cusations of ignorance, politicians may also signal that
they are listening, which would demonstrate that they
are aware of citizens’ concerns. Furthermore, ‘listen-
ing’ has been shown to have a significant effect on cit-
izens’ evaluation of policy decisions (Esaiasson, Gilljam,
& Persson, 2017).
But if they acted in a responsive manner, what type
of responses did MEPs offer their European constituents
in the case of TTIP? Drawing on the literature on com-
municative responsiveness (Esaiasson et al., 2013; Grose
et al., 2015; Hobolt & Klemmensen, 2008), this arti-
cle differentiates between three forms of communica-
tive responses: promises to adapt to public opinion;
signalling by parliamentarians that they listen to pub-
lic concerns; and explanations—justifications—for posi-
tions or decisions.
Previous studies have demonstrated that the EP
tends to present more moderate demands when it ac-
quires more powers (Ripoll Servent, 2013). When more
is at stake, the EP becomes more concerned with “do-
ing good” in institutional terms. In other words, it eases
the pressure in legislative processes to “enhance its rep-
utation as a reliable legislative partner” (Burns & Carter,
2010, p. 132). First of all, with lower levels of salience,
there is less of an audience to respond to. A second pos-
sible reason is that MEPs might want to keep the dis-
cussion with the executive free from public interference.
Finally, making promises could prove futile in a situa-
tion of on-going negotiations. Thus, with lower levels of
salience one could expect MEPs to rely on ‘softer’ forms
of responsiveness, such as signals that they are listening
to public concerns. When salience increases, however,
one would assume that it puts pressure on parliamen-
tarians to provide more substantive responses. If MEPs
are to prove their worth to the European citizenry, one
would expect them to amplify their efforts when their
audiences grow, by justifying their position or making
promises about future choices:
With higher levels of salience, more MEPs make
promises and offer explanations.
2.3. Contribution to Politicisation
While it is reasonable to assume that MEPs are more
likely to want to appear responsive when they know that
an issue is salient to a large public, politicians do not
merely react to the politicalmood, they also try to steer it.
Public pressure can be used as leverage in policy-making
processes, which means that there is an incentive for
politicians to mobilise public opinion to their support. In
other words, politicians may contribute pro-actively to
the politicisation of an issue by performing the “role of
articulating an initial plurality of opinions within society
on issues related to the EU, into a more focused and co-
herent set of claims on policy” (de Wilde, 2011, p. 564).
In the case of TTIP, MEPs could have contributed to politi-
cising an already salient issue by encouraging contesta-
tion (cf. Adam &Maier, 2011) or by expanding the scope
of actors—for example if they put forward their views
in collaboration with, or on behalf of, civil society ac-
tors. De Bruycker (2017) has demonstrated that govern-
ments’ responsiveness increases when an issue is salient
or when civil society mobilises, while polarisation has lit-
tle effect on levels of responsiveness. In this article, how-
ever, the aim is to see whether and how responsiveness
is part of the process of politicisation. If and when MEPs
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claim to listen to concerns, make promises, or offer ex-
planations for their position, they may also contribute to
politicisation of TTIP by contesting the agreement or by
evoking other actors. More salient policy issues have a
higher conflict potential, which makes strategic efforts
to politicise them more likely (cf. Adam & Maier, 2011;
Baumann et al., 2019):
With higher levels of salience, moreMEPs seek to con-
tribute to politicisation.
The following section describes how the four expecta-
tions are investigated.
3. Data and Method
The sources of data in this article are newspaper arti-
cles reporting on TTIP and plenary debates in the EP.
To the average citizen, media is the key access point
for political communication. Moreover, it is a key area
for contestation:
Although it is not the only forum, or form, of pub-
lic debate, the mass media is crucial, because it is
where the general public can gain access to informa-
tion about executive decision making and the stances
of political actors who challenge decisions. (Statham
& Trenz, 2015, pp. 291–292)
At the same time, because MEPs are not free to deter-
mine their response through themedia, plenary debates
about TTIP are used to access ‘un-filtered’ statements.
Surveys show that the majority of Europeans are
favourably disposed to a trade and investment agree-
ment between the EU and the US, but there are also
substantial variations betweenmember states. Germans
and Austrians are by far the most sceptical, while coun-
tries such as France, Sweden and the UK have displayed
a solid majority in favour of the agreement (European
Commission, 2014, 2015, 2016). There are also varia-
tions in how engaged citizens are across Europe. In the
Commission’s public consultation on the investor state
dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism, 79% of the sub-
missions where from Austria, the UK and Germany, and
there is a similar pattern for the European Citizens’
Initiative on TTIP (de Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2015). Based
on public opinion surveys and patterns of engagement,
three countries were selected for investigation. Germany
has had a stable majority of opponents to the deal and a
high level of engagement, Sweden has had a stable ma-
jority supporting the agreement and a moderate level of
engagement, while the UK has had a stable majority, but
also a high level of engagement.
In each of the countries, two quality newspa-
pers were chosen: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and
Süddeutsche Zeitung (Germany); Svenska Dagbladet and
Aftonbladet (Sweden); and The Guardian and The Times
(UK). Not only is there a greater likelihood that quality
newspapers will feature EU actors in their coverage (de
Vreese et al., 2006), but they are also generally seen
as opinion leaders who are likely to influence other me-
dia outlets (Gattermann & Vasilopoulou, 2015, p. 135).
Furthermore, the newspapers are chosen to represent
both sides of the left–right spectrum. Data was collected
from June 2013, when the Council approved the man-
date to open negotiations, until the end of December
2015. The sample includes all articles mentioning TTIP
during that time period. Search words for Sweden were
transatlantisk*, handelsavtal* and TTIP; for Germany
TTIP and Freihandelsabkommen; and for the UK TTIP,
transatlantic trade, EU AND trade. The EP passed two
resolutions on TTIP, one in May 2013, just before the
launch of the talks between the EU and the US, and one
in July 2015, after 9 rounds of negotiations had taken
place. Thus, plenary data is gathered from two occasions
when the EP debated TTIP, focusing on interventions by
MEPs from Germany, UK and Sweden (including explana-
tions for votes; EP, 2013; EP, 2015b).
The article uses claims-making methodology to un-
cover the patterns of the debate and the MEPs’ engage-
ment and response. Claims-making methodology is a
form of content analysis, where the analytical unit is the
‘claim,’ which basically means an actor statement that ex-
presses for instance a political demand, criticism, propos-
als or calls to action (Statham&Koopmans, 2009, p. 437).
Different variables can be assigned to each claim, such
as who is making the claim, when and where it is made,
what the content of the claim is and to whom the claim
is directed (Statham & Koopmans, 2009). In this article,
each claim was coded with country, newspaper and time
period, thenwithwhomade the claim, the content of the
claim, the object of the claim, to whom the claim was di-
rected, and the type of justification for the claim.
To identify level of engagement, the focus was on
who was making the claim, which allows a comparison
between the total number of actors and the share of
MEPs, over time. To study the type of responses offered
byMEPs, three different codes were assigned if the claim
i) contained a promise; ii) signals that the claimant was
listening to particular concerns; iii) that reasons were
given for the claim. An additional code was added if the
justification explicitly evoked an audience, which signals
to whom the explanation attempts to respond2. This is
used as an indicator of attempts to mobilise and expand
the scope of actors, i.e., efforts to politicise an issue. An
additional code used to investigate howMEPs potentially
contribute to politicisation, is towhoma claim is directed.
This code indicates whether and how claims by MEPs
seek to contest or change TTIP and the negotiations, in-
cluding instanceswhere opponentsmake claims towards
supporters and vice versa. An example of such a claim
is when British MEP, Molly Scott Cato (2015, Greens),
2 If a claim is made on behalf of someone, it can also be termed a ‘representative claim’ (de Wilde, 2013). This article, however, does not look at this
aspect, but rather if an audience is evoked, signalling to whom someone is attempting to respond, and potentially also to mobilise.
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wrote: “This week hundreds of protesters against TTIP
have descended on the European Parliament. They are
quite rightly concerned about the threat that this treaty
poses to the British government’s ability to conduct its
affairs in their interests.”
The claims are compared quantitatively, but mainly
qualitatively, in order to analyse degree of politicisation
as well as if and how MEPs communicate with citizens
and respond to their concerns.
4. How Did MEPs Get Engaged in the Debate
About TTIP?
The following analysis first addresses the salience of the
TTIP debate in all three countries. When studying media
debates, one frequently used indicator of salience is the
number of newspaper articles that is being written on
the topic. In this article, although the reporting on the
transatlantic trade negotiations are not compared with
other issues (cf. Hoeglinger, 2016), comparing coverage
of TTIP across time also gives an indication of change
in salience.
Figure 1 shows the number of news articles thatmen-
tion TTIP in Germany, Sweden and the UK, during the
time period under study. In Germany there is a clear pat-
tern of increasing attention to TTIP. Throughout 2013,
the debate was almost completely dominated by the
spying scandal. After documents released by Edward
Snowden revealed that the Americans had been tapping
into Angela Merkel’s phone, a lot of actors demanded
that the TTIP negotiations had to be stopped. Then from
mid-2014 onwards there is a sharp increase in the num-
ber of articles. This coincides with the elections for the
EP in the end of May, where the possibility of a free
trade agreement between the EU and the US became
a hot topic. After that, the overall reporting on TTIP in
Germany remains on a high level although with a slight
downward trend in 2015.
In Sweden, there is no steady pattern of rising
salience as in Germany. The overall impression based on
the coverage over time, is that the Swedish debate re-
flects a relatively low level of salience. Over time, the one
spike in coverage is around the EP and general elections
in May and September 2014 where TTIP became a con-
tested topic among Swedish parties. Thus, despite low
levels of salience, the news reporting is not dominated
by surrogate reporting, as was for instance the case for
the debate about the EU constitution (Trenz, Conrad, &
Rosén, 2009). The media debate in Sweden largely re-
flects national considerations regarding TTIP, rather than
observing for instance the German debate. The results
for the UK also reflect a lower level of salience. In 2013,
the UK debate is mainly focused on the spying scandal
in Germany. However, TTIP was increasingly put in a UK
context in the run-up to the EP election in the spring of
2014, and even more so during the months around the
UK general elections a year later. It was particularly the
issue of the National Health Service (NHS) that instigated
discussion—although there is a marked difference here
between The Times and The Guardian, with the former
seeming not to pay much attention to the NHS debacle.
Given these variations in salience between the differ-
ent countries, the subsequent question is, how didMEPs
engage in the evolving debates? Based on the expecta-
tions above, we would assume all MEPs to be more en-
gaged thanmembers of Parliament (MPs), but thatMEPs
in Germany have a lower level of engagement over time
than in Sweden and the UK.
4.1. Level of Engagement
The set of conjectures delineated above all build on the
assumption that MEPs are somehow receptive to citi-
zens’ concerns. Ripoll Servent’s (2013) study of the EP’s
influence on the Data Retention Directive before and af-
ter the Lisbon Treaty, shows for instance that once a co-
legislator, the EP becamemore concerned about appear-
ing as a responsible actor, rather than pushing for its own
agenda. Furthermore, trade policy may also trigger par-
ticular national interests, whichmeans thatMEPs have to
adjudicate between their commitments to their national
party, to their EU party group, as well as to their voters.
This may have a form of silencing effect that discourages
them fromparticipating in debates on TTIP. However, this
does not seem to be the case for TTIP—at least not for
the MEPs as a whole. Although the share of MEPs in the
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Figure 2. Engagement ofMEPs relative toMPs. Note: The number of claimsmade byMEPs andMPs areweighted according
to the share of articles published.
total sample of media debates is moderate with around
11% of the claims made by MEPs, they do feature regu-
larly in the newspaper coverage. In Sweden for example,
over half of the non-executive actors in Swedish media
debates are MEPs; MPs or other representatives of polit-
ical parties3.
Another way of analysing the engagement of MEPs is
to compare their visibility to that of nationalMPs. Amain
assumption of this article is that TTIP is an occasion for
MEPs to demonstrate their value to the EU citizenry. If
that were the case, one would expect MEPs not only to
engage in public debates, but also that they are more en-
gaged than national MPs, which can be taken as an in-
dicator that MEPs take a lead in the TTIP debate—also
at the national level. Thus, the figure above shows how
MEPs feature in the sample, relative to MPs.
In all three countries there are more claims made
by MEPs than by MPs under the period of June 2013
through December 2015. Although there are some fluc-
tuations over time, the predominant pattern is thatMEPs
feature more than MPs. This testifies to the assump-
tion that TTIP is an issue where MEPs assume owner-
ship. It is important to note here that themedia also give
voice to EU parliamentarians outside of their own coun-
try. Both British and Swedish newspapers covered the
controversies Germany extensively. In the UK, for exam-
ple, most MEPs found in the sample from 2013 are not
British, but German MEPs speaking out against the spy-
ing scandal. Several of the claimsmade by SwedishMEPs
stem from op-eds. A string of contributions by MEPs dis-
cussed back and forth the transparency of the negoti-
ations as well as controversial issues such as the ISDS
mechanism. Especially around the time of the EP elec-
tions in the spring of 2014, TTIP was a frequent topic,
whilst the months after were characterised more by re-
actions to events taking place at the EU level, e.g., the
July 2015 vote in the EP. Once the British debate turned
its focus inwards towards the middle of the time period,
British MEPs becomemore visible, but so do British MPs,
who not only dominated the debate about NHS, but also
started mobilising around TTIP, especially in the period
around the general elections with some Labour mem-
bers taking a very strong stand against the EU–US deal.
According to The Times (Hopkins, 2015), then shadow
chancellor John McDonell said TTIP would “allow corpo-
rations ‘to steal’ from ordinary people.”
Looking only at claims made by MEPs, in Sweden,
the percentage of the total number of claims is around
20% compared to around 8% in Germany, but the total
number of claims made by MEPs in Germany is higher,
which is unsurprising given the amount of coverage in
the German press. At the same time, while the num-
ber of claims by MEPs in Sweden drop immediately af-
ter the EP has gone forward with its vote in July 2015,
German MEPs remain active throughout the period un-
der study. This calls into question the expectation that
MEPs in countries with increasing issue salience have a
lower level of engagement. The autumn of 2015 was a
period where the German public was mobilising strongly
against TTIP, with a lot of demonstrations and commu-
nity meetings taking place. German MEPs might be wak-
ing up to the fact that they need to somehow react to the
massive resistance towards the agreement in Germany.
Summing up, although the numbers are rather small,
these patterns not only refute the suggestion that MEPs
do not engage in media debates, but also indicate that
parliamentarians at the EU level are taking the lead in the
TTIP debate.Moreover, there is little evidence of a silenc-
3 By comparison, national governments—whilst clearly pro-TTIP—were not very active, but Trade Commissioner Malmström was highly visible in the
Swedish debate from the time her candidacy was announced at the end of the summer of 2014.
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ing effect, potentially resulting from the cross-pressure
MEPs are facing (again, it has to be underlined that find-
ing only holds for MEPs as a whole. The silencing effect
could be more prevalent for some parties than others.
However, the data used in this article is too small to
gauge this properly). Being visible, however, is not the
same as being responsive. Thus, the subsequent ques-
tion is what characterises MEPs’ engagement.
4.2. Responsiveness
Following the expectation that issue salience generates
more substantial responses by MEPs, we would pre-
sume that German MEPs are more likely to offer ex-
planations and promises compared to the Swedish and
BritishMEPs, particularly from 2014 onwards when issue
salience increases.
Many claims by Swedish MEPs contain explanations.
For example, when arguing for the soundness of the ISDS
mechanism.MEP Christofer Fjellner (2013), from the EPP
group, refers to Sweden’smany similar investment agree-
ments, and argues that such a mechanism is not about
undermining democracy, but about securing respect for
basic legal principles. By contrast, it is very uncommon
for MEPs to signal that they are listening to people’s con-
cerns, and also few promises are made.
In the UK, throughout most of 2013 it is the German
spying scandal and its potential effects on the TTIP talks
that dominate, and most of the parliamentarians fea-
tured in these articles are from the EP or Germany—
not British. Towards the end of the year and in the
period leading up to the EP elections, more MEPs en-
ter the scene, but still—at least in the TTIP context—
there are fewer claims by British MEPs compared to
other European countries. This indicates support for
Gatterman and Vasilopoulo’s (2015) finding that British
MEPs get little coverage. Instead, as described above,
British MPs took centre stage as the TTIP debate got en-
tangled with national party politics. In December 2014,
the Home Affairs Committee questioned Theresa May
about the NHS and other committees issued reports on
TTIP during 2015. Compared to Germany and Sweden,
and althoughMEPs dominate in the whole sample, more
MPs are visible in the UK coverage around the general
elections in May 2015, when Cameron’s plans for ne-
gotiating a new deal with the EU came on the agenda.
When the NHS is the topic, there are examples of sev-
eral responsive claims, such as Andy Burnham promis-
ing that his Labour government would exempt NHS from
TTIP (Jones, 2014). The pressure on the British govern-
ment increased throughout 2015, starting with a debate
in the House of Commons in mid-January, where MPs
voiced their concerns over various aspects of the deal
such as the ISDS mechanism and food safety. All claims
contain explicit justifications for positions voiced and are
as such responsive.
Almost immediately after the launch of the negoti-
ations in June 2013, the news about the US spying on
Germany broke, and several GermanMEPs replied by de-
manding to freeze the TTIP negotiations. This demand
dominates almost all claimsmade byMEPs in the sample
from 2013 as well as the first half of 2014. From then on,
MEPs focus more on the negotiations and content of the
EU–US deal. However, there is little to suggest that MEPs
in Germany, where salience has been increasing, have a
higher propensity to respond in a particular manner. The
claims made by German MEPs do not differ much from
those of their British and Swedish colleagues. Promises
to adapt and signalling that they are listening are rare,
whereas explanations are prevalent.
Although promises might be slightly more prevalent
during the period when there was a spike in attention
to TTIP in the British newspapers, the Swedish exam-
ple showed that also Swedish MEPs tend to give ex-
planations for their positions, regardless of the level
of salience. This pattern is also characteristic of the
German debate, suggesting that issue salience is not nec-
essary for MEPs to justify their positions. With regards
to promises made, there is perhaps a small indication of
a stronger relationship, but the numbers are too small
to conclude. Whether they justify their claim with ref-
erence to public opinion and public concerns—i.e., are
explicit about who they respond to—also varies a lot,
both across the three countries and over time. However,
one trait is recurrent in all three countries: While most
MEPs might refer to public opinion on occasion, oppo-
nents of TTIP are more likely to do so, throughout the
time period. They also use public interest to contest
the agreement. For example, in an op-ed MEP Malin
Björk (2015, European United Left–Nordic Green Left
[GUE/NGL]), together with colleagues from the Swedish
parliament, states:
The Swedish Government must now say what they
think. Should citizens, democracy, climate and labour
law go first, or big business? The Left party demands
that the EU Commission and the government take se-
riously the legitimate concerns of the critics of the
TTIP agreement.
Thus, the subsequent question is, whether and
how MEPs make claims that seek to contribute to
politicisation.
4.3. Contribution to Politicisation
What we expect is that MEPs seek to contribute to politi-
cisation when issue salience increases by attempting to
expand the scope of conflict through evoking a larger
set of actors and contesting the agreement. Thus, we ex-
pect that German MEPs are more likely to contribute to
politicisation, due to the higher level of salience in the
national media.
When Swedish parliamentarians respond to conflict-
ing viewpoints, they are mainly directed at opposing
political parties. One MEP candidate from the Leftist
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Vänsterpartiet, for example, accused the government
coalition of putting “the interest of big business be-
fore food, environment and even democracy” (Björk,
2014). Following the general elections in September
2014,MEP Fjellner (2014) from the outgoing governmen-
tal party Moderaterna expressed his “genuine worry”
about Sweden’s position as a free trade nation with a
new social democratic government in office. While sub-
ject to party competition, TTIP did not seem to gainmuch
traction in the general public. In fact, a Eurobarometer
from November 2016 showed that at the time support
for TTIP among Swedish citizens was actually increasing
(European Commission, 2016). To the extent that they re-
spond to public concerns in combination with a claim for
or against a given policy, this is more or less exclusive to
parties opposing TTIP, who refer to public opinion in or-
der to justify their demands for changing or stopping the
agreement. Still, a lot of the Swedish claims are directed
at political opponents, meaning that they contribute to
politicise the debate. To a certain extent, one could say
that the Swedish debate resembles what Zimmermann
(2019) calls “layered” politicisation. Political actors con-
test each other’s positions, and some also attempt to
mobilise a larger set of actors, but the level of salience
remains relatively low throughout the time period.
In the UK, the party conflict appears to be lower on
TTIP, perhaps because the debate is also conducted in
the shadow of Brexit. With NHS, contestation increases,
but there are still not a lot of examples of claims that
are explicit about the audience to which it responds, nor
are there many claims that use public opinion to contest
the agreement. Taking into account that the numbers
are too small to draw firm conclusions, MEPs also take
part in the debate, echoing the concerns of opponents of
the deal. As mentioned by Molly Scott Cato (2015, MEP,
Greens): “This week hundreds of protesters against TTIP
have descended on the European Parliament. They are
quite rightly concerned about the threat that this treaty
poses to the British government’s ability to conduct its af-
fairs in their interests.” Only in the case of the NHS, how-
ever, do such claims appear to be accompanied by a spike
in issue salience.
From 2015 onwards, corresponding to increasing
salience, more responses that refer explicitly to peo-
ple’s concerns also ask for moderation. MP Adrian Bailey
(Labour), for example, was cited by The Guardian call-
ing for a more informed discussion: “Campaigners, lob-
byists, business groups, government and the European
Commission also need to do more to engage with the ev-
idence rather than make unsupported claims about the
benefits or risks of TTIP” (Elliot, 2015). Similar examples
can be found in the discussion over ISDS in Sweden. Like
their British and Swedish colleagues, those who support
TTIP attempt to temper criticism: “The Germans fear be-
ing swept away by the Americans, which expresses a
lack of self-confidence” (MEP Elmar Brok [EPP], 2015).
Others express their understanding that people worry
when they do not know what is being negotiated, going
on to assure: “We do not want to lower our high stan-
dards in Europe, such as food and healthcare. We do
not want to allow intervention in local self-government”
(MEP Angela Niebler [EPP], 2015). These can be seen as
examples of claims that are responsive, but also that at-
tempt to de-politicise the debate, i.e., trying to contain
conflict rather than amplify it. Thus, a pattern emerges
of across the three countries of supporters of TTIP aim-
ing to de-politicise the debate by refuting criticism, i.e.,
by responding to people’s concerns they attempt to alle-
viate contestation.
Still, the data material displays a greater tendency
also among those who support TTIP to be more specific
about red lines and demands to the Commission and/or
government midway into the period under study, which
is when the salience of TTIP increased. In Sweden, al-
though one must keep in mind that the numbers are
small, there are few examples of supporters staking their
claims in a similar manner, at least in the media sam-
ple, but in the UK there are signs of a comparable de-
velopment, particularly on the issue of the NHS. This
potentially has a different effect compared to the ex-
plicit efforts to de-politicise the debate, because it am-
plifies contestation.
Swedish MEPs wrote several op-eds on TTIP, which
would allow them to choose how to approach read-
ers. Nevertheless, journalists may act as filters on some
forms of claims, discarding responsive statements, be-
cause it does not quite fit their story. During plenary de-
bates MEPs are able to shape their own message in full.
Looking at the plenary debates on TTIP in the EP from
2013 and 2015, confirms the tendency of parliamentari-
ans becoming more specific on their conditions for sup-
port of the deal.
In 2013, MEP Bernd Lange from the Progressive
Alliance of Socialists and Democrats explains his group’s
support for TTIP on economic grounds, while indicating
someapprehension about the negotiation partner’s stan-
dards (EP, 2013). TTIP supporter Daniel Caspary’s (EPP)
interventions clearly reflect that he does not see a great
need to engage with voters’ concerns. Instead he argues
that most Germans trust politicians to manage trade pol-
itics, and that “a large part of the citizens in Europe just
do not want to deal with such topics” (EP, 2013). In line
with themedia data, only the opponents to TTIP are clear
on whose behalf they are taking a stand. An intervention
by MEP Scholz (GUE/NGL), for example, explicitly refers
to specific “worries of the people,” and that his party
group assesses every agreement according to the inter-
est of the people (EP, 2013). This is a clear example of a
claimwhere he not only justifies his position, but also sig-
nals that the he listens to people’s concerns and makes
the promise that his party will reject any deal that do not
meet these key points.
During the plenary debate two years later, the sit-
uation is different (EP, 2015b). The opponents of TTIP
are not the only ones taking contingent positions. Elmar
Brok (EPP) declares: “no lowering of standards!”, while
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his colleague, Angelika Niebler, promises to make it
clear to the Americans “what cannot be done with
us Europeans” (EP, 2015b). Several similar responsive
claims are found among the British MEPs across the po-
litical spectrum. Many of these claims also evoke pub-
lic opinion. Joachim Schuster (Progressive Alliance of
Socialists and Democrats), for example, states that they
have succeeded in picking up many of the issues that
have been discussed in public and translated them into
conditions to the Commission. MEP Cecilia Wikström
(Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe group),
in defending her vote for TTIP, makes a promise to “the
thousands of citizens of Sweden” who have contacted
her that “the norms and values we safeguard in the
EU should in no way be sacrificed or lowered through
TTIP” nor will “[p]roducts that do not meet EU high stan-
dards” be approved in the European market (EP, 2015b).
Moreover, there clearly is a difference between the de-
bates in 2013 and 2015, with the overwhelming majority
of MEPs offering explanations for their positions.
5. Concluding Discussion
The analysis of the TTIP debate in Germany, Sweden and
the UK showed differences in issue salience. Germany ex-
perienced increasing issue salience throughout the time
period. In Sweden and the UK, TTIP was not nearly as
salient, albeit with spikes of attention around the EP and
national elections. The expectation thatMEPsweremore
engaged than MPs received some support, which testi-
fies to the assumption that TTIP was an occasion where
they could take ownership of an issue. However, the ex-
ample of the UK shows that when an EU matter gets en-
tangled with an issue that is sensitive to national politics,
such as the NHS, MPs become active and MEPs take the
backstage. With the new generation of free trade agree-
ments that increasingly go behind border addressing na-
tional regulations, MEPs might still face significant com-
petition from national MPs if and when a trade agree-
ment spurs debate about policy issues that hit close to
home, as with the NHS in the UK.
The expectation that more MEPs tend to offer
promises and explanations with increasing salience also
needs additional qualification. Issue salience appears to
be neither necessary nor sufficient to generate claims
that contain promises or explanations. There are several
factors that could incite MEPs to make responsive claims.
The example of Sweden illustrates this where the de-
bate about TTIP is characterised by marked party com-
petition throughout the time period. Furthermore, there
might also be factors that dissuade responsive behaviour.
There is little evidence in the data that higher levels of
salience lead to less engagement byMEPs. However, this
is the case for all MEPs, whereas there might be differ-
ences between parties that are beyond the emphasis of
this article.
Another question is what precisely MEPs are re-
sponding to. Issue salience is only one component of
the broader phenomenon of politicisation, and it could
be that polarisation would provoke different reactions.
Furthermore, de Bruycker (2017) has shown that issue
salience and mobilisation of civil society actors caused
elites to refer to public interests more often. This article
has focused on issue salience, however, because an aim
was to see how MEPs contributed to politicise TTIP. The
fear that EP empowerment would contribute to politi-
cise EU trade policy receives ambivalent backing. A con-
sistent finding is that the opponents of TTIP most fre-
quently evoke the ‘voice of the people,’ regardless of
level of issue salience. This is a finding that cuts across
all three countries as well as time. Supporters, however,
tried to de-politicise the debate and contain conflict.
Nevertheless, because increasing issue salience seems to
coincide with making demands for support, supporters
as well might contribute to expanding the scope of the
conflict over TTIP.
Two implications of these findings deserve a more
detailed discussion. First, they demonstrate the multi-
faceted relationship between responsiveness and politi-
cisation. Parliamentarians use responsive claims to
demonstrate that they react to specific public concerns,
but also to draw attention to their own position and
mobilise the public when combined with a claim di-
rected against other actors. In other words, parliamen-
tarians not only react to politicisation, they also attempt
to make politicisation happen by evoking public opin-
ion. However, responsiveness can also be used in a de-
politicising manner, as the statements from several sup-
porters of TTIP show. Such claims contain a form of com-
municative response, e.g., an explanation, whilst also
evoking a specific public opinion, but without an ac-
companying claim for a change of policy. Uncovering
the pattern of claims that serve these contradictory pur-
poses, and the conditions under which claims-making
contributes to politicisation or de-politicisation should
be the topic of future studies.
Secondly, there is a growing literature on how politi-
cians (and non-elected) use claims to convince voters of
their eminence as representatives (e.g., de Wilde, 2013).
The question is how the degree and type of responsive-
ness is part of such efforts to establish a representa-
tive relationship. The aim of this article was to begin
to explore how responsiveness feature in representative
claims-making. Future research should do this more sys-
tematically using larger data, in order to uncover the con-
ditions under which parliamentarians act responsively in
variousways.While policy responsiveness is the ultimate
evidence that citizens’ interests are taken into account,
communicative responsiveness, as has been the focus
of this article, is of key importance to the maintenance
of representative processes. In order to increase our un-
derstanding of the workings of our representative politi-
cal systems, we should continue our study of how parlia-
mentarians communicate to and with those they claim
to represent.
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